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ABSTRACT 
In this paper differential attack on S-DES is 
carried out. S-DES is the reduced version of 
DES algorithm. This algorithm operates on 
8-bit message block with 10-bit key and DES 
operates on 64-bit message block with 56-bit 
key.  This paper analyzed the differential 
attack on S-DES. Differential attack is used 
to break a cipher by trying each possible key. 
Keyword S-DES, encrypt, decrypt, 
cipher function 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Security is the main concerns of the 
organizations participating in the information 
revolution.  Although cyber space has 
become new arena of information exchange 
and commerce, it can become a place for new 
forms of old crimes. Cryptographers are 
constantly searching for the perfect security 
system, a system that encrypts quickly but is 
hard or impossible to break. [1] 
1.1 S-DES 
S-DES is a reduced version of the DES 
algorithm. It has similar properties to DES 
but deals with a much smaller block and key 
size (operates on 8-bit message blocks with a 
10-bit key). It was designed as a test block 
cipher for learning about modern 
cryptanalytic techniques such as differential 
cryptanalysis. 
It is a variant of Simplified DES. The same 
key is used for encryption and decryption. 
Though, the schedules of addressing the key 
bits are altered so that the decryption is the 
reverse of encryption. An input block to be 
encrypted is subjected to an initial 
permutation IP. Then, it is applied to two 
rounds of key-dependent computation. 
Finally, it is applied to a permutation which 
is the inverse of the initial permutation. [2] 
2.  DIFFERENTIAL ATTACK 
ON S-DES 
Differential cryptanalysis is a chosen 
plaintext/ chosen ciphertext attack.[3]  In 
which the attacker is able to select inputs to a 
cipher and examine the Output. Differential 
cryptanalysis provides a good understanding 
of the possible weakness of cipher and 
techniques to overcome them. Differential 
cryptanalysis involves the analysis of the 
effect of the plaintext pair difference on the 
resulting ciphertext difference.[4]Consider 
the following basic linear cipher function: 
       C = P K 
We take the difference pair of ciphertext with 
no information about key: 
 C C’ = P K P’ K 
  C C’= P P’ 
The above equation shows us the difference 
between the plaintext is the same as the 
difference between ciphertext because of 
linearity of the function.[4] 
 ΔY given ΔX 
X Y 0 1 2 3 4 5 
0000 01 00 10 01 00 11 01 
0001 11 00 10 10 11 11 01 
0010 00 00 01 01 11 11 10 
0011 01 00 01 10 00 11 10 
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0100 10 00 10 01 00 11 01 
0101 00 00 10 10 11 11 01 
Table-1: Difference pair table for So 
S-DES is not a linear function. Thus, the 
difference between ciphertext is not equal to 
difference between plaintext. In S-DES, the 
difference in a ciphertext pair for a specific 
difference of a plaintext pair is influenced by 
the key [5]. 
2.1. Difference pairs of an s-box 
The input difference pairs of an S-Box is 
denoted as ΔX and output difference pairs of 
an S-Box is denoted as ΔY.  
         Where,     
                               ΔX = X’  X’’ 
                   And     ΔY = Y’    Y’’          
 X’ and X’’ are the plaintext and Y’ and Y’’ 
are output of difference pair table. 
2.2   Difference distribution 
table 
In this table row is represented by  ΔX and 
column  by ΔY  and the element represents 
the number of occurrences. 
 With the help of this table we can 
obtained the input and output 
values from their differences.[5] 
We have ΔX = 12 and ΔY = 3, Number of 
occurrence = 2. Then input pair is (6,10) & 
(10,6) 
 We can also find  the key bits 
which are involved in S-Box if the 
input pairs and output difference 
are known.[5] 
Assuming X’=6, X’’=10 and  the S-Box is 
So.Then Y’=3 and Y’’=0 & ΔY=3.Let the 
inputs of S-Box X’&X’’ are xoring with 
same key and  we will find the output 
I’&I’’.I’=X’ K and I’’=X’’ K. because 
we used the same key so key has no 
influenced on the input difference value so 
from the above analysis-ΔX= ΔI=6  10=12 
Now from the distribution table we obtained  
that  ΔX=12 and ΔY = 3 have the 2 possible 
values, so there are two possible value for   
the key.since ΔI=12 then the possible value  I 
that can satisfy the distribution table  is  4  
and  8 for these value ΔY must be equal to 
zero. 
K=X  I, the first possible key is obtained  
from 
K=I’   X’=4  6=2 and K=I’   X’’=4  
10=14. 
so the obtained  keys  are 2 and 14.in the 
same manner, 
K=I’’  X’=8  6=14 and K=I’’  X’’=8  
10=2. 
Table-2: Difference distribution table for 
So 
2.3 Differential characteristics 
With the help of differential characteristics 
we find the subkey, k’’ used in the last round. 
We create a differential characteristic using 
the following difference pair.[6] 
ΔX= 12, ΔY=3 
E = [3  0  1  2  1  2  3  0] 
ΔUi = 10010110 
Using figure 1 we obtained ΔVi 
ΔVi = 01100100 
 Output difference 
ΔY 
Input Difference ΔX 0 1 2 3 
0 16 0 0 0 
1 0 8 4 4 
2 0 4 12 0 
3 4 4 0 8 
4 0 4 0 12 
5 4 4 8 0 
6 0 8 4 4 
7 8 0 4 4 
8 2 2 10 2 
9 4 4 0 8 
10 10 2 2 2 
11 0 8 4 4 
12 2 10 2 2 
13 8 0 4 4 
14 2 2 2 10 
15 4 4 8 0 
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Figure – 1: differential characteristics 
3. IMPLEMENTATION OF 
DIFFERENTIAL ATTACK 
3.1   Implementation steps 
 Step followed in differential cryptanalysis as 
follows 
1. The plaintext is encrypt with 
unknown key. 
2. Now for finding the ΔI  encrypt the 
plaintext with assumed key. 
3. Find the value of I’ & I’’ using 
difference pair table, For that value 
ΔY=0. 
4. Now xoring the plaintexts with I’ 
& I’’ and get possible values of 
keys K1  and K2. 
5. Decrypt the ciphertext using  K1. If 
Plaintext is matched then 
encryption is cracked. Otherwise 
use K2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure – 2: Generation of ciphertext using 
unknown key 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure – 3:  Generation of I’ & I’’ using 
assumed key 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure – 4: Evaluation of actual key 
4. RESULT 
This section shows that the result obtained by 
running the differential attack on S-DES in 
C. 
Round 1 input differential characteristics, 
ΔUi=96 
ΔUi =[1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0] 
   f 
  ΔVi=[0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0] 
1
 
Plaintext X’ 
Encryption 
algorithm 
Ciphertext Y’ 
Unknown  key 
Dencryption algorithm K’ 
If plain 
text is 
match 
Encryption 
cracked 
Ciphertext Y’ 
yes 
no 
 Plain text X’      
Encryption                                        
algorithm 
Assumed key 
 Cipher text 
Plain text X’’ 
Encryption 
algorithm 
Cipher text 
 ΔI=ΔX 
Find the value of I’ &I’’ 
from the distribution table 
and for that      ΔY=0 
I’ X’=K’ and I’’
 X’=K’’ 
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Round 1 output differential characteristics, 
ΔVi=64 
Expansion E= [3 0 1 2 1 2 3 0] 
S-Box 
input 
Possible 
keys 
Actual key 
00000100 
00001000 
00000010 
00001110 
00000010 
00000111 
00001101 
00000101 
00001111 
00000101 
00000010 
00001010 
00000010 
00001010 
00001010 
I. When S – Box input are 4 & 8, 
possible key 2 & 14  are applied on S- 
Box & ciphertext is cracked by key 2 
then key 2 is actual  key. 
II. When S – Box input are 7 & 13, 
possible key 5 & 15  are applied on S- 
Box & ciphertext is cracked by key 5 
then key 5 is actual  key. 
III. When S – Box input are 2 & 10, 
possible key 2 & 10  are applied on S- 
Box & ciphertext is cracked by key 
10 then key 10 is actual  key. 
5.   CONCLUSION 
The represented result shows that the 
differential attack found 8 bit of the subkey 
of the last round. These sub key bits are the 
actual 8 bits of the S-DES 10 bit key, 2 bit 
are still missing i.e. found by matching  of 22   
possibilities. 
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